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Abstract. Public key infrastructure is used in most networks requiring user 
authentication, digital signature, cryptographic confidentiality, and non 
repudiation of information. The main protocols and architectures used in a PKI 
are the public key cryptosystem and the RSA digital signature. Their robustness 
is based on the difficulty to obtain prime factors of a large composite number. 
Notwithstanding, if the primes generated by a PKI are predictable or represent a 
small set of possible primes, the security of the PKI certificate is compromised. 
This article is part of a line of research aiming to develop auditing tools of PKI 
performance and to detect anomalies in the generation and distribution of prime 
values delivered by OpenSSL, if such anomalies are present. 
Keywords: Asymmetric Cryptography, PKI, OpenSSL, RSA, integer primes, 
predictable primes. 
1 Introduction 
Confidentiality is one of the cornerstones of Information Security, according to the 
Norms BS 7799, ISO 17799 and others from the family ISO 27000. Cryptography 
provides cryptographic primitives for this service upon user and system requests. 
Web server authentication, web browsing secure sessions, home-banking operations, 
virtual private networks (VPN), and e-commerce communications are some of the 
basic uses of confidentiality obtained through the application of cryptography. 
Therefore, the absence of anomalies is essential in the sub-systems dealing with 
user authentication through public key cryptography. Otherwise, the system becomes 
vulnerable to attacks. Communication could fail if somebody knows the private key 
[1,2]. 
The way a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can be injured if the rate of certificated 
collisions emited is higher than the mathematical expected rate [4]. Also, a 
methotology for the detection of bad function is an Open-SSL system is presented by 
means for a formula [5]. 
This investigation tries to show our experience on searching collisions of prime 
numbers in the RSA module. Among more than 40.000.000 certificates from a PKI. 
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In this way, we compare the given values though our experience. With the predictions 
from mathmatical model. In case they do not,  we will propose new formulaes or we 
should go on checking those formulaes. 
Investigations regarding this specific issue up to now has shown no antecedent, 
since our work has been restricted to an only PKI. 
Lenstra and others researches [10] have found prime collisions, but in many PKI, 
stating 0.2% collisions when the spectatives are 0%. In millions of  PKI´s users this 
ratio is significative. 
This paper is a “work in progress” that means it is a parcial investigation through a 
line that has been going on for the last two years in our laboratory [3]. As we show in 
our previous presentation in the simposiums and congress. In JAIIO 2012 we had 
detailed a procedure to develop an auditing tool for SSL Oracles with public key 
frameworks and RSA encrypting schemes [6]. 
2 Public Key Infrastructure: Overview 
The concept of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can be traced back to the ideas of 
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman published in 1976 in which users have two types 
of keys for cryptographic purposes: a public and a private key. 
PKI technology constitutes a valuable resource to develop, for instance, user 
authentication, encrypted message transmission using other user public keys, own 
message encryption/decryption, and digital signature authentication or non-
repudiation of transmitted information [9]. 
PKI implementation may be public or private. It generates certificates delivered 
through a system based on the confidence of the certification authority and digital 
signatures. 
3 RSA System 
In 1977, Ron Rivest, Asi Shamir, and Len Adleman from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) presented a mathematical model following the Diffie-
Hellman ideas. The system is known as RSA system.1 Its widespread applicability 
granted its popularity. 
The basic RSA ciphering system consists of a 3-tuple (e, d, N) where e is the public 
key, d is the private key and N is the module, also public. 
Security of these primitive cryptographies relies on the difficulty finding prime 
factors of large composite numbers, and on the discrete logarithm problem, making 
processing impossible in the short run, at least with current calculation tools. 
The source of a message m is encrypted by raising it to the power e of the receiver 
and its module N, following Gaussian congruencies. After this operation, the 
encrypted message c is obtained and transmitted. The receiver raises c to the d power 
module N, recovering the original message m. 
                                                          
1
 After their last names. 
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RSA has also a digital signature system based on the same logic but reversing the 
steps of the process. 
In mathematical terms: 
 
Encryption 
 
c≡ me mod (N) (1) 
 
where m: message, e: public key, and c: encrypted message. 
 
Decryption: 
 
m ≡ cd mod (N) (2) 
 
where m: message, d: private key, c: encrypted message. 
 
N is the product of two prime numbers. PKI searches such primes through trial and 
error.2  It generates a number of an appropriate size. It runs a primality test and if the 
number fails the test, PKI generates a new one. But if the number passes the rest, it 
generates a second one to obtain two “primes.” 3 
The product of these primes, p and q, determine N;  i.e.: 
 
N=p*q (3) 
 
In addition, d (the private key) is calculated as a function of e (the public key): 4 
 
e*d≡ 1 mod ( (p-1)*(q-1) ) (4) 
 
Where 
 
(p-1)*(q-1) = ϕ (N) (5) 
 
This expression is known as Euler´s totient function for N. 
Here lies the robustness of the system: finding d (the secret private key which 
opens the message) requires solving equation (4) which, in turn, involves solving 
formula (5). With p and q unknown, there is no expeditious method to find prime 
factors of a sufficiently large N. Thus, the system is robust [11]. 
                                                          
2
  No algorithm is yet known to generate prime numbers; hence, the trial and error approach.  
3
  The fastest primality tests used in a PKI are stochastic processes which consider a given 
number to be a probable prime if it passes the test a quantity v of times.; for example, the 
Rabin-Miller test. Because of the calculations involved, a deterministic primality test would 
prove impractical.  
4
  By convention, e = 65537 = 216+1.  e = 3 has also been used, but this low value can generate 
vulnerabilities. 
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Secure Sockets Layer – SSL protocols, and later Transport Layer Security TLS, 
have modules to search for p, q, and d, to calculate e, and to issue the resulting 
certificate (N, e, d). 
4 SSL and TLS Vulnerability: The Debian Case 
The system keeps p and q hidden behind N. Vulnerabilities could arise from 
programming errors in the search modules for p and q. For example, the system could 
generate a reduced set of primes. 
This vulnerability grants access to computer crime or intrusions into public or 
private systems, disturbing legitimate users and dangerously damaging security.  
Attackers can clone certificates, hack user identities, access systems, e-mail 
accounts, and banking or credit card information; thus, they can use the information to 
their advantage, among other violations. 
Bad programming can also turn the list of prime numbers predictable and therefore 
decrease the quantity of N modules generated. 
In this framework, OpenSSL does not offer a safe working mode based on an 
unbiased probability distribution of modules with a large cardinality for the set of 
prime numbers predicted by Number Theory. Hence, it turns to an unsafe mode, 
based on a biased distribution of cryptographic modules. 
The situation described in the previous section is genuine. It was identified by 
Luciano Bello, an argentine researcher of the OpenSSL toolkit included in the Debian 
system. Its first vulnerable version 0.9.8c-1 was published on September 17th, 2006. 
Due to a variable initialization error, the number generator turned predictable. 
Hence, it became vulnerable to brute-force attack over a reduced set of 215 values. 
After notifying developers, a report was published as DSA 1571-1on May 13th, 
2008, under the title New OpenSSL packages fix predictable random number 
generator [7, 12] 
A bug is an unintentional programming error; i.e. an authentic error. However, a 
viral code is the inclusion of malicious code to pass unnoticed during software 
review. 
All systems relying on this Oracle for security had an open vulnerability for about 
twenty months. 
¿Bug or viral code? Clearly, administrators of Information Security Management 
Systems cannot allow these types of errors, regardless of their origin. 
In this years has been detected more vulnerabilities in Debian´s Open-SSL and 
come more [8, 13, 14]. 
5 Anomaly Detection in the Performance of OpenSSL: Toy 
Model. 
This methodology uses statistical tools to detect anomalies in the performance of a 
PKI. Considering that the size of real certificates is greater than 1024 bits, formulae 
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adjustment and corrections become difficult due to the high magnitudes and great 
quantity of numbers.5 
Hence, the complexity of the problem is reduced by using the smallest certificates 
accepted by OpenSSL, i.e. 64 bits. 
Methodologically, this reduction is knows as a Toy Model. The formula links the 
sample size c of requested certificates with the probability h of occurrence of at least 
one collision and with r indicating the quantity of primes of a given size that 
OpenSSL can generate. 
Then, 
 
 
 
(6) 
6 Experimental Procedure for Prime Collision Search in 
OpenSSL. 
6.1 Analisys. 
Tests were carried out to search for shared primes, also known as prime collision. 
A PKI was installed and implemented for this purpose in an OpenSSL, version XX 
in a lab computer. The program was set to issue 64-bit certificates. C++ software was 
designed to request certificates and to store them in a vector of prime factors for each 
N.  PKI was requested to deliver each certificate in a 5-tuple of the type (N, e, d, p, q) 
to reduce calculation load. 
Whenever this is not possible, the scheme can be replaced with the factorization of 
N, given e and d – an algorithm developed previously in this line of research. [1, 2, 8]. 
Given the probabilistic nature of these primes, the tool searches for repeated values 
of primes in the issued certificates in samples of size c, and obtains the value of h, as 
given by formula (6) where h is the probability to find at least one shared prime in the 
sample. 
With the results from all samples, the value of h is calculated; i.e., the empirical 
probability of finding at least one repeated prime or prime collision en c certificates. 
6.2 Experimental Difficulties: Rise in Complexity. 
The software stores a table with the values of primes p and q of each issued 
certificate. It checks whether a certificate has already been issued by the PKI. If that is 
the case, it notes a collision, following the procedure up to a total of c requests. 
As the table size increases, the complexity of the problem also increases, in time as 
well as in space. 
A significant increase in RAM memory use was observed. The computer can 
process up to 2000 samples of 1000 certificates each; i.e., a total of 2 million 64-bit 
certificates.  
                                                          
5  For instance, the number of primes in an N of 1024 bits  is 5,7*2500  while for 64 bits is 1.4*231. 
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Whenever a larger set of samples were processed, a memory overflow error 
occurred, abruptly stopping the process. The reason for this error has yet to be 
determined. Assessments are being carried out to identify the cause of the alleged 
anomaly. 
However, it has been determined that when processing for each sample is 
complete, the variables reset and there should be no apparent reason for RAM 
memory to halt the process due to saturation. 
6.3 Experimental Results. 
Despite the previous discussion, the real time of running the experiment was 
significantly greater than expected. Notwithstanding, 40 million 64-bit certificates 
were analyzed grouped in samples of 1000 certificates each. In other words, 80 
million primes were processed in search for collisions, in groups of 2000. 
The experimental value of h was obtained, the probability of finding at least one 
repeated prime grouped in 1000 certificates of 2 different primes each. 
The obtained value of h is 0.66128571. Hence, at least 661 certificates contain 
repeated primes for each 1000 requests of the 64-bit size. 
These results are significantly higher than expected, according to formula (6). 
Considering c equals 1000 and k = 1.4*231 primes of 32-bit size, the probability of 
collision h is 0.0000012910868 – a much lower value tan the results obtained. 
7 Conclusions and Future Work 
Analysis suggests that collisions may have originated from requesting a large 
quantity of certificates within a small lapse between one request and the next.  
Further considerations aim to determine whether the distribution of prime 
collisions suggests some pattern evading the random process for selection of primes. 
In the case that the distribution of collisions does not present anomalies, this factor 
shall be disregarded. 
Another possibility is that some mechanism in the generation of primes within 
OpenSSL did not react with sufficient margin; thus, it did not give the generator 
“seed” enough time to change, yielding the same prime [5,6]. 
Considering that OpenSSL is an open source tool, access to codes is granted. 
Search within the code for the prime generation processes is an arduous endeavor. In 
this manner, Luciano Bello detected the bug in the Debian case, as mentioned in 
section 4.  
However, this type of search is what the present proposal is aiming to avoid by 
developing an auditing tool of the performance of such processes: to avoid code 
reviews in account of the complexity of their analysis. 
In addition, the tool could audit the performance of SSL and TSL protocol 
applications, even when they belong to commercial or boxed software, whose owners 
do not reveal the programming codes. 
The entire experimental design is undergoing full review, before concluding that 
the OpenSSL could be malfunctioning [9]. 
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Thus, the following elements are currently under evaluation: Formulae used in the 
calculations of the model, Software development and Open SSL installation. 
Furthermore, experimental trials are being conducted again, increasing the number 
of repetitions. 
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